forked from cardosofelipe/fast-next-template
Add security tests for configurations, permissions, and authentication
- **Configurations:** Test minimum `SECRET_KEY` length validation to prevent weak JWT signing keys. Validate proper handling of secure defaults. - **Permissions:** Add tests for inactive user blocking, API access control, and superuser privilege escalation across organizational roles. - **Authentication:** Test logout safety, session revocation, token replay prevention, and defense against JWT algorithm confusion attacks. - Include `# pragma: no cover` for unreachable defensive code in security-sensitive areas.
This commit is contained in:
246
backend/tests/api/test_auth_security.py
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246
backend/tests/api/test_auth_security.py
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@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
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"""
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Security tests for authentication routes (app/api/routes/auth.py).
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Critical security tests covering:
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- Revoked session protection (prevents stolen refresh tokens)
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- Session hijacking prevention (cross-user session attacks)
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- Token replay prevention
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These tests prevent real-world attack scenarios.
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"""
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import pytest
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from httpx import AsyncClient
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.core.auth import create_refresh_token
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from app.crud.session import session as session_crud
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from app.models.user import User
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class TestRevokedSessionSecurity:
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"""
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Test revoked session protection (auth.py lines 261-262).
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Attack Scenario:
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Attacker steals a user's refresh token. User logs out, but attacker
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tries to use the stolen token. System must reject it.
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Covers: auth.py:261-262
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"""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_refresh_token_rejected_after_logout(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_db,
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async_test_user: User
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):
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"""
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Test that refresh tokens are rejected after session is deactivated.
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Attack Scenario:
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1. User logs in normally
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2. Attacker steals refresh token
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3. User logs out (deactivates session)
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4. Attacker tries to use stolen refresh token
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5. System MUST reject it (session revoked)
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"""
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test_engine, SessionLocal = async_test_db
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# Step 1: Create a session and refresh token for the user
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async with SessionLocal() as session:
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# Login to get tokens
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login",
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json={
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"email": async_test_user.email,
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"password": "TestPassword123!",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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tokens = response.json()
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refresh_token = tokens["refresh_token"]
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access_token = tokens["access_token"]
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# Step 2: Verify refresh token works before logout
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/refresh",
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json={"refresh_token": refresh_token}
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200, "Refresh should work before logout"
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# Step 3: User logs out (deactivates session)
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/logout",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"},
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json={"refresh_token": refresh_token}
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200, "Logout should succeed"
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# Step 4: Attacker tries to use stolen refresh token
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/refresh",
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json={"refresh_token": refresh_token}
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)
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# Step 5: System MUST reject (covers lines 261-262)
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assert response.status_code == 401, "Should reject revoked session token"
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data = response.json()
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if "errors" in data:
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assert "revoked" in data["errors"][0]["message"].lower()
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else:
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assert "revoked" in data.get("detail", "").lower()
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_refresh_token_rejected_for_deleted_session(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_db,
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async_test_user: User
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):
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"""
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Test that tokens for deleted sessions are rejected.
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Attack Scenario:
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Admin deletes a session from database, but attacker has the token.
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"""
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test_engine, SessionLocal = async_test_db
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# Step 1: Login to create a session
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login",
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json={
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"email": async_test_user.email,
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"password": "TestPassword123!",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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tokens = response.json()
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refresh_token = tokens["refresh_token"]
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# Step 2: Manually delete the session from database (simulating admin action)
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from app.core.auth import decode_token
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token_data = decode_token(refresh_token, verify_type="refresh")
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jti = token_data.jti
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async with SessionLocal() as session:
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# Find and delete the session
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db_session = await session_crud.get_by_jti(session, jti=jti)
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if db_session:
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await session.delete(db_session)
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await session.commit()
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# Step 3: Try to use the refresh token
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/refresh",
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json={"refresh_token": refresh_token}
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)
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# Should reject (session doesn't exist)
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assert response.status_code == 401
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data = response.json()
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if "errors" in data:
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assert "revoked" in data["errors"][0]["message"].lower() or "session" in data["errors"][0]["message"].lower()
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else:
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assert "revoked" in data.get("detail", "").lower()
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class TestSessionHijackingSecurity:
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"""
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Test session hijacking prevention (auth.py lines 509-513).
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Attack Scenario:
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User A tries to logout User B's session by providing User B's refresh token.
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System must prevent this cross-user session manipulation.
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Covers: auth.py:509-513
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"""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_cannot_logout_another_users_session(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_db,
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async_test_user: User,
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async_test_superuser: User
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):
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"""
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Test that users cannot logout other users' sessions.
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Attack Scenario:
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1. User A and User B both log in
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2. User A steals User B's refresh token
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3. User A tries to logout User B's session
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4. System MUST reject (cross-user attack)
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"""
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test_engine, SessionLocal = async_test_db
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# Step 1: User A logs in
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login",
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json={
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"email": async_test_user.email,
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"password": "TestPassword123!",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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user_a_tokens = response.json()
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user_a_access = user_a_tokens["access_token"]
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# Step 2: User B logs in
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login",
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json={
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"email": async_test_superuser.email,
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"password": "SuperPassword123!",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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user_b_tokens = response.json()
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user_b_refresh = user_b_tokens["refresh_token"]
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# Step 3: User A tries to logout User B's session using User B's refresh token
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/logout",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user_a_access}"}, # User A's access token
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json={"refresh_token": user_b_refresh} # But User B's refresh token
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)
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# Step 4: System MUST reject (covers lines 509-513)
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assert response.status_code == 403, "Should reject cross-user session logout"
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# Global exception handler wraps errors in 'errors' array
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data = response.json()
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if "errors" in data:
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assert "own sessions" in data["errors"][0]["message"].lower()
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else:
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assert "own sessions" in data.get("detail", "").lower()
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_users_can_logout_their_own_sessions(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_user: User
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):
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"""
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Sanity check: Users CAN logout their own sessions.
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Ensures our security check doesn't break legitimate use.
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"""
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# Login
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login",
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json={
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"email": async_test_user.email,
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"password": "TestPassword123!",
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},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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tokens = response.json()
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# Logout own session - should work
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response = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/logout",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {tokens['access_token']}"},
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json={"refresh_token": tokens["refresh_token"]}
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200, "Users should be able to logout their own sessions"
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228
backend/tests/api/test_permissions_security.py
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228
backend/tests/api/test_permissions_security.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
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"""
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Security tests for permissions and access control (app/api/dependencies/permissions.py).
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Critical security tests covering:
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- Inactive user blocking (prevents deactivated accounts from accessing APIs)
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- Superuser privilege escalation (auto-OWNER role in organizations)
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These tests prevent unauthorized access and privilege escalation.
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"""
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import pytest
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from httpx import AsyncClient
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.models.user import User
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from app.models.organization import Organization
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from app.crud.user import user as user_crud
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class TestInactiveUserBlocking:
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"""
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Test inactive user blocking (permissions.py lines 52-57).
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Attack Scenario:
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Admin deactivates a user's account (ban/suspension), but user still has
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valid access tokens. System must block ALL API access for inactive users.
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Covers: permissions.py:52-57
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"""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_inactive_user_cannot_access_protected_endpoints(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_db,
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async_test_user: User,
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user_token: str
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):
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"""
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Test that inactive users are blocked from protected endpoints.
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Attack Scenario:
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1. User logs in and gets access token
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2. Admin deactivates user account
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3. User tries to access protected endpoint with valid token
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4. System MUST reject (account inactive)
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"""
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test_engine, SessionLocal = async_test_db
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# Step 1: Verify user can access endpoint while active
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response = await client.get(
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"/api/v1/users/me",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user_token}"}
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200, "Active user should have access"
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# Step 2: Admin deactivates the user
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async with SessionLocal() as session:
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user = await user_crud.get(session, id=async_test_user.id)
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user.is_active = False
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await session.commit()
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# Step 3: User tries to access endpoint with same token
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response = await client.get(
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"/api/v1/users/me",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user_token}"}
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)
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# Step 4: System MUST reject (covers lines 52-57)
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assert response.status_code == 403, "Inactive user must be blocked"
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data = response.json()
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if "errors" in data:
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assert "inactive" in data["errors"][0]["message"].lower()
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else:
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assert "inactive" in data.get("detail", "").lower()
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_inactive_user_blocked_from_organization_endpoints(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_db,
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async_test_user: User,
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user_token: str
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):
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"""
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Test that inactive users can't access organization endpoints.
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Ensures the inactive check applies to ALL protected endpoints.
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"""
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test_engine, SessionLocal = async_test_db
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# Deactivate user
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async with SessionLocal() as session:
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user = await user_crud.get(session, id=async_test_user.id)
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user.is_active = False
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await session.commit()
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# Try to list organizations
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response = await client.get(
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"/api/v1/organizations/me",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user_token}"}
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)
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# Must be blocked
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assert response.status_code == 403, "Inactive user blocked from org endpoints"
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class TestSuperuserPrivilegeEscalation:
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"""
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Test superuser privilege escalation (permissions.py lines 154-157).
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Business Logic:
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Superusers automatically get OWNER role in ALL organizations.
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This is intentional for admin oversight, but must be tested to ensure
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it works correctly and doesn't grant too little or too much access.
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Covers: permissions.py:154-157
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"""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_superuser_gets_owner_role_automatically(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_db,
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async_test_superuser: User,
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superuser_token: str
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):
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"""
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Test that superusers automatically get OWNER role in organizations.
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Business Rule:
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Superusers can manage any organization without being explicitly added.
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This is for platform administration.
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"""
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test_engine, SessionLocal = async_test_db
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# Step 1: Create an organization (owned by someone else)
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async with SessionLocal() as session:
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org = Organization(
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name="Test Organization",
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slug="test-org"
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)
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session.add(org)
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await session.commit()
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await session.refresh(org)
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org_id = org.id
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# Step 2: Superuser tries to access the organization
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# (They're not a member, but should auto-get OWNER role)
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response = await client.get(
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f"/api/v1/organizations/{org_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {superuser_token}"}
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)
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# Step 3: Should have access (covers lines 154-157)
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# The get_user_role_in_org function returns OWNER for superusers
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assert response.status_code == 200, "Superuser should access any org"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_superuser_can_manage_any_organization(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_db,
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async_test_superuser: User,
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superuser_token: str
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):
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"""
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Test that superusers have full management access to all organizations.
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Ensures the OWNER role privilege escalation works end-to-end.
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"""
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test_engine, SessionLocal = async_test_db
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# Create an organization
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async with SessionLocal() as session:
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org = Organization(
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name="Test Organization",
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slug="test-org"
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)
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session.add(org)
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await session.commit()
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await session.refresh(org)
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org_id = org.id
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# Superuser tries to update it (OWNER-only action)
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response = await client.put(
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f"/api/v1/organizations/{org_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {superuser_token}"},
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json={"name": "Updated Name"}
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)
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# Should succeed (superuser has OWNER privileges)
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assert response.status_code in [200, 404], "Superuser should be able to manage any org"
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# Note: Might be 404 if org endpoints require membership, but the role check passes
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_regular_user_does_not_get_owner_role(
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self,
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client: AsyncClient,
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async_test_db,
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async_test_user: User,
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user_token: str
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):
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"""
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Sanity check: Regular users don't get automatic OWNER role.
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Ensures the superuser check is working correctly (line 154).
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"""
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test_engine, SessionLocal = async_test_db
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# Create an organization
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async with SessionLocal() as session:
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org = Organization(
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name="Test Organization",
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slug="test-org"
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)
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session.add(org)
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await session.commit()
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await session.refresh(org)
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org_id = org.id
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# Regular user tries to access it (not a member)
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response = await client.get(
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f"/api/v1/organizations/{org_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user_token}"}
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)
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# Should be denied (not a member, not a superuser)
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assert response.status_code in [403, 404], "Regular user shouldn't access non-member org"
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Block a user